Beyond ‘Islam’ vs ‘Feminism’ by Mir?Hosseini, Ziba
1 Introduction
The term ‘Islamic feminism’ gained currency in
the 1990s as a label for a brand of feminist
scholarship and activism associated with Islam
and Muslims. There has since been much
discussion and debate and a growing literature
on ‘Islamic feminism’. Inevitably, there are
diverging accounts of the nature of this
phenomenon and of its origins and development.1
The problems lie both in the explicit issue of how
the term is defined and in the implicit meanings
it has acquired in usage. This article offers some
reflections on the term and the heavy political
baggage that comes with it – as well as with its
component elements, ‘Islamic’ and ‘Feminism’.
Both Islam and feminism are contested concepts
that mean different things to different people
and in different contexts. Each is the subject of
multiple discourses and widely ranging
perspectives that can be addressed at different
levels. I shall argue here that the composite term
‘Islamic feminism’ has become so loaded with
disputed meanings and implications, so
enmeshed in local and global political struggles,
that it is no longer useful in any kind of
descriptive or analytical sense.
The aim of this article is two-fold. First, I want to
set the record straight and to explain the context
in which I have used the term myself, and the
kind of feminism that is involved. I shall reflect
on the term in the light of developments in the
intervening years, culminating in two events in
2009, that I believe show how far the debate has
moved on, globally and locally: the launch of
Musawah, a ‘Global Movement for Equality and
Justice in the Muslim Family’ and the emergence
of the Green Movement in Iran. Musawah,
launched in Kuala Lumpur in February, brings
Islamic and human rights frameworks together
to build an overlapping consensus among Muslim
women from diverse backgrounds and
perspectives, and to push for legal reform.2 The
Green Movement in Iran started in June as a
protest against a fraudulent presidential
election, but it soon became a civil rights
movement in which Iranian women have been
the most prominent actors.3
Second, I want to explore the ambivalence that
many women, religious or not, feel towards either
the feminist or the religious aspects of their
identities. It is this ambivalence, I argue, that is
the subtext of most narratives on ‘Islamic
feminism’; debates on this phenomenon often
become a battlefield where the basic issues at
stake are unspoken. Among them are the vexed
relationship between feminism and religion and
the common but implicit assumption that
feminism can only emerge and flourish when
religion is relegated to the private space that to a
large extent shaped the development of feminism
in Western contexts. The privatisation of religion
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became one of the main tenets of feminism, seen
as a prerequisite for the development of a
feminist consciousness and a movement. But in
Jose Casanova’s (2007) words, the process of
‘deprivatisation’ of religion has become a
relatively global trend, while simultaneously we
are also seeing the emergence of new feminisms.
2 Questions to ask
We need to start by asking: Whose Islam? Whose
Feminism? These questions continue to remain
unaddressed in most discussions of Islamic
feminism, whether in academic or activist
forums. This, in my view, to a large extent
explains the lack of clarity in the literature on
the subject, which is plagued by unstated
agendas, anxieties and unresolved issues. We
know little of the personal narratives and
trajectories of the so-called Islamic feminists,
whose scholarship and activism have been the
subject of academic or journalistic narratives.
How do they experience their faith? What is their
understanding of Islam’s textual sources? How do
they engage with the patriarchal legal tradition?
What were their inner thoughts, the experiences
that shaped their feminist consciousness, their
hesitations, their fears, their silences?
For nearly three decades, these questions have
been at the heart of my scholarship and my life. 
I start with my own definition of the two
components. I understand ‘feminism’ in the
widest sense. It includes a general concern with
women’s issues, an awareness that women suffer
discrimination at work, in the home and in
society because of their gender, and action aimed
at improving their lives and changing the
situation. There is also an epistemological side to
feminism: it is a knowledge project in the sense
that it sheds light on how we know what we know
about women’s rights in law, including laws that
take their legitimacy from religion, enabling us
to challenge, from within, the patriarchy that is
institutionalised in a legal tradition.
As for ‘Islamic’, I must stress that I firmly
distinguish this from ‘Islamist’. ‘Islamism’, as I
have defined in print, is no more or less than
‘political Islam’ – a commitment to public action
to implement what Islamists regard as an Islamic
agenda, commonly summarised in slogans such as
‘Islam is the solution’ or ‘Return to Sharia’.
‘Islamic’, on the other hand, when attached to
another ism such as feminism, means merely
finding inspiration and even legitimacy in Islamic
history and textual sources (Mir-Hosseini and
Tapper 2010). Many people so inspired prefer to
call themselves, if anything, ‘Muslim feminists’.4
There is no necessary association of ‘Islamic’ or
‘Muslim’ with ‘Islamism’ or political Islam, nor
any necessary association of ‘feminism’ with lack
of religious faith or inspiration.5 I challenge those
who implicitly make these associations to make
them explicit and to defend them.
As for ‘religion’ more generally, the English word
‘religion’ is full of ambiguities. I argue that those
who talk of Islam, or indeed of ‘religion’ in
relation to Islam, often fail to make a distinction,
now common, when talking of religion in other
contexts, namely between faith (and its values
and principles) and organised religion
(institutions, laws and practices). The result is
the pervasive polemic/rhetorical trick of either
glorifying a faith without acknowledging the
horrors and abuses that are committed in its
name, or condemning it by equating it with those
abuses. Similarly, it is better to avoid contrasting
‘faith’ with ‘politics’ (chalk vs cheese) and rather
to note that a term (din, as much as ‘religion’)
that is so ambiguous that it can encompass faith
and belief, legal traditions and discourses, and
organisational structures and positions, has
enormous political potential – not least in the
Islamist slogans just mentioned.
Here, I follow Abdolkarim’s Soroush’s distinction
between religion (din) and religious knowledge
(mar’efat dini). In his words:
Our understanding of revealed texts is
contingent upon the knowledge already set
around us; that is to say that forces external
to Revelation drag our interpretation and
understanding of it in various directions …
Believers generally conceive of religion as
something holy or sacred, something constant.
You cannot talk about change or evolution of
religious knowledge. They stick to the idea of
fixity. But as I have demonstrated in my work,
we have to make a distinction between
religion on the one side and religious
interpretation on the other. By religion here I
mean not faith, which is the subjective part of
religion, but the objective side, which is the
revealed text. This is constant, whereas our
interpretations of that text are subject to
evolution. The idea is not that religious texts
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can be changed but rather over time
interpretations will change. We are always
immersed in an ocean of interpretations. The
text does not speak to you. You have to make
it speak by asking questions of it.
(Soroush 1996)
In many ways, it is the notion of Sharia that is
the problem. We all think we know what Sharia
is, yet its meanings are widely contested. In the
Western context, and for some Muslims, Sharia
has become synonymous with patriarchal laws
and cruel punishments; with polygamy, stoning,
amputation of limbs. Yet, for the mass of
Muslims, Sharia is the essence of justice, while
for Islamists, Sharia is a powerful political
ideology. In Muslim tradition, however, Sharia is
generally a theological and ethical concept more
than a legal one; it is associated with the sacred,
denoting the totality of God’s will as revealed to
the Prophet Muhammad.
In my own recent work (Mir-Hosseini 2009a), I
have sought to keep the distinction clearly made
and maintained in classical Islamic legal texts,
between Sharia and fiqh or jurisprudence – the
process of human attempts to discern and
extract legal rules from the sacred sources of
Islam and the ‘laws’ that result from this process.
What we ‘know’ of ‘Sharia’ is only an
interpretation, an understanding; fiqh, on the
other hand, as in any other system of
jurisprudence and law, is human and mundane,
temporal and local. Any claim that a specific law
or legal rule ‘is’ Sharia, is a claim to divine
authority for something that is in fact a human
interpretation. I believe it is crucial to keep this
distinction, to separate the sacred from the legal
in the body of law that is commonly subsumed
under the label of Sharia or Islamic law. Without
this distinction, reinterpretation and legal
change become difficult or impossible.
3 The emergence of feminist voices in Islam
As I have argued elsewhere, two events made
1979 a turning point in the politics of religion,
law and gender, and in time became catalysts for
the emergence in Muslim contexts of a feminism
that takes its legitimacy from Islam.6 The first
was the adoption by the United Nations General
Assembly of the Convention on the Elimination
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), which gave gender equality a clear
international legal mandate. The second was the
popular revolution that brought clerics to power
in Iran and began the reversal of the process of
secularisation of laws and legal systems that had
begun in Muslim contexts earlier in the century.
The decades that followed saw the concomitant
expansion, globally and locally, of two equally
powerful but opposed frames of reference. On
the one hand, the human rights framework and
instruments such as CEDAW gave women’s
rights activists what they needed most: a point of
reference, a language and the tools to resist and
challenge patriarchy. The 1980s saw the
expansion of the international women’s
movement and of women’s NGOs all over the
world, including Muslim countries. By the early
1990s, a transnational movement further
coalesced around the idea that violence against
women was a violation of their human rights,
and succeeded in inserting it into the agenda of
the international human rights community. In
their campaigns, they made visible various forms
of gender-based discrimination and violation
rooted in cultural traditions and religious
practices, and protection from violence became a
core demand of women’s human rights activists.
On the other hand, Islamist forces – whether in
power or in opposition – started to invoke Islam
and Sharia as a legitimising device to reverse the
process of reform and secularisation of laws and
legal systems that had begun earlier in the
century. Tapping into popular demands for social
justice, the Islamist rallying cry of ‘Return to
Sharia’ led to regressive gender policies, with
devastating consequences for women:
compulsory dress codes, gender segregation, and
the revival of cruel punishments and outdated
patriarchal and tribal models of social relations.
All these developments widened the gap between
religious and secular Muslims, and intensified
the conflict between ‘Islamists’ and ‘feminists’.
While feeding (on) older stereotypes, old
polemics between Islam and the West were
reignited. Islamists continue to portray
‘feminism’ as an extension of colonial politics, as
a Western plot to undermine the Muslim way of
life, that had to be rejected in the name of Islam.
Many women’s rights activists, on the other
hand, have attacked regressive Islamist policies
using older Orientalist and essentialist
narratives of Islam as a monolith inherently
incompatible with modernity and gender
equality.
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By the early 1990s, the conflict between these
bitterly opposed isms found a kind of resolution in
the emergence of a new gender discourse that
came to be called ‘Islamic feminism’.7 I originally
used the term to refer to a number of Islamist
Iranian women who after the 1979 revolution had
played a crucial role in silencing other women’s
voices: for example Shahla Sherkat, the editor of
the official women’s magazine Zan-e Ruz; Azam
Taleqani, who took over the pre-revolutionary
Women’s Organisation and destroyed all their
books; Zahra Rahnavard, who wrote the seminal
text on hijab and denounced feminism. By the
early 1990s, these women had become
disillusioned with the Islamic Republic’s official
discourse on women, some of them in official
positions had stood down and had joined the ‘New
Religious Thinkers’, who later were the core of
the reform movement. Sherkat started the
feminist magazine Zanan; Taleqani founded
another, Payam-e Hajer, and Rahnavard was a
university teacher and artist. In my conversations
with them in the mid-1990s, these women had no
problem with being called ‘Islamic feminists’,
which they found an apt description – even if
some of them did not yet accept the feminist
premise of gender equality. They still saw
themselves as part of the Islamic Republic and
retained close ties with the political elite.
The only women in Iran who had difficulty with
the term were those activists who either were
working with government organisations or
remained loyal to the early gender discourse of
the Islamic Republic. Notable among them was
Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh, who wrote a four-
part article8 in the official magazine Zan-e Ruz
(where Shahla Sherkat had been editor before
founding Zanan), arguing there was no need for
feminism in Islam. When I first met her in 1992,
she happily called herself an ‘Islamist’; she was
not against equality but saw feminism as
irrelevant to Iran and Muslims, since Islam
provides women with all they need to argue for
and to acquire equality. But after 1997, she
joined the reform movement and by the mid-
2000s was adamantly calling herself a ‘secular
feminist’. This radical identity shift was typical
of many women who were young and ardent
Islamist activists in the 1970s and 1980s,
especially those married to male Islamists who
gained political office and power after the 1979
Revolution. There are many personal and
political factors behind such a shift, including
family situation (most of these women had
divorced their Islamist husbands),
disappointment with the gender policies of the
Islamic Republic, and exposure to international
feminism. Abbasgholizadeh, for example, had
been among the official Iranian delegates to the
1995 United Nations Women’s Conference in
Beijing, where she encountered diaspora Iranian
feminists and other scholars and activists, with
whom she engaged in dialogue and interaction.
As the term gained currency in the late 1990s,
most of those defined by academics and
journalists as ‘Islamic feminists’ rejected either
the ‘Islamic’ or the ‘feminist’ part of the term. If
they came from a religious background and
addressed women’s rights within an Islamic frame
of reference, they wanted to avoid any kind of
association with the term ‘feminism’; their gender
activism was a mixture of conformity and
defiance. If they came from a secular background
and addressed women’s rights from within
broader feminist discourses, they rejected being
called ‘Islamic’, even though many of them
located their feminism in Islam. Those associated
with political Islam took contradictory positions
and made confusing statements with respect to
gender equality. For them, the wider project of
gaining power and establishing an Islamic state
took priority over equality and democracy. Some,
like Azam Taleqani (Mir-Hosseini 2002) and the
Egyptian Zainab Al-Ghazali, in line with the
dominant Islamist discourse, rejected gender
equality as a ‘Western’ import (Cooke 1994) and
instead advocated the ‘Muslim values’ of
domesticity and motherhood. Interestingly, both
these women live a very ‘feminist’ style of married
life and have managed to free themselves from
the constraints imposed by the very Islamist
discourse they advocated for other women.
Others, like Heba Rauf Ezzat and Nadia Yassin,
who belong to the younger generation of Islamists,
continue to reject in public what they see as the
dominance of ‘Western definitions’ of equality,
although in private they are much more nuanced
in their arguments. Their public positions clearly
have to conform with their place in the political
movements and organisations to which they
belong;9 they are clear that for them, political
Islam comes first; that the issue of gender
equality must remain subordinate to this priority.
In the course of these encounters, I came to
realise that the women I called ‘Islamic feminists’
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did not speak with one voice. The positions they
took were local, diverse, multiple and evolving.
They all sought gender justice and equality for
women, but they did not always agree on what
constitutes ‘justice’ or ‘equality’ or the best ways
of attaining them. I saw it as futile and even
counter-productive to try to put these diverse
voices into neat categories and generate
definitions.10 To understand a movement that is
still in formation, I argued that we might start by
considering how its opponents depict it, in other
words, the resistance against which it has had to
struggle. I saw three broad categories of
opponents of what I defined as ‘the feminist
project in Islam’: Muslim traditionalists, Islamic
fundamentalists and secular fundamentalists.
Muslim traditionalists are those who resist any
changes in what they hold to be eternally valid
ways, sanctioned by an unchanging Sharia.
Islamic fundamentalists – or Islamists – are those
who advocate political Islam, seeking to change
current practices by a return to what they claim
to be a ‘purer’ version of the Sharia, which they
hope to implement through the machinery of the
modern nation state. Secular fundamentalists
deny that any religion-based law or social practice
can be just or equal, or relevant to modern times;
in my encounters with them in meetings and
seminars, I found them as dogmatic and
ideological as religious fundamentalists.
I have argued that what I called ‘Islamic
feminism’ – feminism that takes its legitimacy
from Islam – was the ‘unwanted child’ of political
Islam; it did not emerge because the Islamists
offered an egalitarian vision of gender relations.
They did not. Rather, their agenda of ‘return to
the Sharia’ and their attempt to translate into
policy the patriarchal gender notions inherent in
classical jurisprudence, provoked women to
increase criticism of these notions and spurred
greater activism among secular feminists, who
were now internationalised and had the
legitimacy of human rights on their side. The
Islamists’ defence of patriarchal rulings as ‘God’s
Law’ and as promoting an authentic and
‘Islamic’ way of life, brought the classical
jurisprudential texts out of the closet. A growing
number of women came to question whether
there was an inherent link between Islamic
ideals and patriarchy; they saw no contradiction
between their faith and their aspiration for
gender equality. Political Islam gave them the
language to sustain a critique of the gender
biases of Muslim family laws in ways that were
previously impossible, which opened a space, an
arena, for an internal critique of patriarchal
readings of the Sharia that was unprecedented in
Muslim history. True, there were always Muslim
jurists and reformers who argued for an
egalitarian interpretation of the Sharia, but in
my view, it was only in the late 1980s that we
started to see the emergence of critical voices
and scholarship from within the tradition in
literature that deserves the label feminist in the
sense that it is sustained and informed by a
feminist analysis that inserts gender as category
of thought into religious knowledge (Mir-
Hosseini 2009a).11
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the 11 September
2001 attacks, the politics of the ‘war on terror’,
the illegal invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq –
both partially justified as promoting ‘democracy’
and ‘women’s rights’ – the subsequent revelations
of abuses in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and
Bagram, and the double standards employed in
promoting United Nations sanctions, have
discredited international human rights ideals in
the eyes of many. The gap between these ideals
and the practices of their proponents increasingly
invited accusations of hypocrisy. In the first
decade of the new century, ‘feminism’ – now
commonly identified with international human
rights law and its politics – and ‘Islam’ – now
often reduced to Islamists and their slogan of
‘return to Sharia’ – lost legitimacy and moral
authority in many quarters.
I myself started to have problems with the term
‘Islamic feminism’, when Valentine Moghadam
wrote her 2000 piece, ‘Islamic Feminism and its
Discontents: A Note on a Debate’.12 There she
categorised me, along with Afsaneh Najamabadi
and Nayereh Tohidi, as a ‘protagonist’ of Islamic
feminism, set against Haideh Moghissi and
Hamed Shahidian as antagonists, and sought to
resolve the issue from what she presented as the
meta level of ‘feminism’ – as though her own
position gave her the right to do so.
It is interesting that some of those now classed
as key ‘Islamic feminist’ thinkers or advocates
are among those who once found ‘Islam’ and
‘feminism’ irreconcilable. Prominent among
them are Fatima Mernissi and Haleh Afshar who
in their earlier feminist incarnations sought to
expose the patriarchal inner logic of Islamic
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texts; for them, patriarchy was inherent to Islam.
But in their later writings they abandoned this
position and adopted a new approach, going back
to the sources to find feminist texts and readings
(Mir-Hosseini 1999: 5–6). Neither has written
about how this change of heart came about; both
have been silent on their intellectual trajectories,
although Mernissi has no qualms with writing
about her personal life and has provided us with
valuable reflections. Likewise, others who have
written about Islamic feminism seem to feel that
they have no need to talk about their own
relationship with the faith into which they were
born and raised.
I find this silence significant; it speaks of the
ambivalence that many women, whether Muslim
or non-Muslim, feel towards certain aspects of
their identities. The silence has both strategic and
epistemological consequences: strategic, because
it allows old polemics, unhealed wounds, to fester,
and divides women and progressive forces;
epistemological, because feminism, in addition to
being a consciousness and a movement, is also a
knowledge project, part of a critical engagement
with all branches of knowledge, including religious
knowledge. Feminist scholarship in Islam, as in
any other religious tradition, has much to offer to
both the understanding of religion and the search
for justice. It can tell us how and why Islamic legal
tradition became as patriarchal as it is, how the
tension between the egalitarian and hierarchical
voices and tendencies in the tradition played out;
how, by the time that the fiqh schools emerged,
women’s voices were silenced in the production of
religious knowledge. Space unfortunately does not
allow elaboration here of this important issue.13
4 The personal is political
My own research now seeks to contribute to the
production of feminist knowledge in Islam. I owe
my current interest and focus to my involvement
with Iranian feminism and ‘Sisters in Islam’ in
Malaysia. I reflect briefly on my personal and
intellectual trajectory – it is not that I consider
my own story to be either important or
representative, but because I believe in the
feminist dogma that the personal is political, that it
can show why and how the dichotomy between
feminism (or gender policy) and religion,
implicit in many discussions on gender and
Islam, is unhelpful and even false. We all, as
scholars and/or activists, are situated beings and
must recognise that the legacy of colonialism and
the Western hegemony does not allow any of us
complete freedom of manoeuvre and analysis.
The accident of birth and our experiences shape
our feminism and sometimes chain us; they allow
us to be effective only at certain times and in
certain contexts; in short, we must recognise the
politics of identity.
My own feminist consciousness is rooted in my
birth, childhood and education in Iran between
1952 and 1974, and my experience of living in an
Islamic Republic in the early 1980s. In the
preface to Islam and Gender, I have written about
my own trajectory: how, early on I was neither
feminist nor political; I did not have the harsh
and brutal experiences of many women activists
in the years after the revolution; rather, it was
through personal experiences in family and
marriage that I came to experience the harshness
of the system (Mir-Hosseini 1999). I see a
number of turning points in my own involvement
with the politics of feminism and Islam.
In the 1980s, my research focused on marital
disputes and women’s strategies in family courts
in Iran and Morocco. My year of research in
Morocco (1988–9) shaped my feminism. I came
to know Fatima Mernissi, whose brand of
feminism and work I admired and who was then
my intellectual hero; I formed close friendships
while working with Moroccan feminist
organisations. But I was unsettled by what I saw
as the gap between their worlds and those of the
women I was meeting in the family courts; they
spoke two different languages, both literally and
figuratively. Mernissi’s published work was in
French and her work did not reach ordinary
Moroccan women. In 1992, I completed a book
on my research in the Iranian and Moroccan
divorce courts, in which I tried to maintain the
scholarly objectivity I had absorbed in my 1970s
student days, and I kept myself out of the text. I
was nonetheless experiencing a turbulent,
transformative re-thinking of my identity as a
person and an academic. Although the book was
on the whole well received, I was upset by a
number of insulting and distorted reviews by
‘secular’ Iranian feminists.14
In 1992, I returned to Iran after four years’
absence, and did fieldwork in Kurdistan among
the Ahl-e Haqq mystical sect. This was a
transforming personal experience for me, which I
have yet to write about. In Tehran the same year, I
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witnessed the emergence of a new gender
discourse being published in the new women’s
magazine Zanan. In 1993, I began collaboration
with Mohsen Saidzadeh, the cleric who wrote
feminist articles (usually under a pseudonym) for
this magazine and with his help, I also began an
intense study of juristic texts and practices. In
1995, I carried out several months’ research
among religious families and seminaries in Qom
ending in the confiscation of my field materials by
a security organisation in Tehran. In the preface
to Islam and Gender, I describe this incident and
how my way of recovering from the traumatic loss
was a decision to write the book as a personal
search for understanding and to put myself firmly
on the page, which I had avoided in my earlier
book, Marriage on Trial (Mir-Hosseini 1993).
In 1996, while writing Islam and Gender, I met the
documentary film-maker, Kim Longinotto, and
we decided to make a film in Tehran inspired by
the court cases depicted in Marriage on Trial (Mir-
Hosseini 1993). Over the next 18 months,
extended negotiations in London and Tehran for
permission to shoot the film helped me to cross
the line between academia and activism (Mir-
Hosseini 2002). The global success of Divorce
Iranian Style following its premiere in 1998, and
the good reception of Islam and Gender after its
publication in 1999, completely transformed my
status both in the academic field of Iranian
studies and in the world of Iranian women
activists and academics. My approach – in
particular, my attempt to understand Islamic
clerics without condemning them out of hand –
was taken seriously by academics who had
previously ignored or sought to dismiss my work,
and I found that students and younger
generation diaspora Iranians, in particular, found
my work engaging and enlightening.
In 2002, I began working with the Malaysia-
based NGO, Sisters in Islam. Trips to
conferences and meetings in Malaysia and
Indonesia opened a new world to me, where I was
accepted without question. I did not have to
explain my identities as a feminist and a Muslim.
There were none of the tensions between
religious and secular feminists that pervaded the
circles in which I had been operating previously. I
wrote a paper (published in the new journal
Hawwa in 2003) on ‘The Construction of Gender
in Islamic Legal Thought’, my first contribution
to religious knowledge. I wrote, not as an
academic anthropologist merely concerned to
analyse and explain, but as an activist in search
of solutions.15
Between 2002 and 2008, I taught for a semester
in alternate years as Visiting Professor in the
Global Law Program at New York University
(NYU). I found remarkable similarities between
the language and mindset of academic lawyers at
the NYU Law School and those of clerical jurists
in the Qom seminaries. In 2004–5, I was a fellow
of the Berlin Institute of Advanced Study, where
I had the opportunity for sustained engagement
with another fellow, Abdolkarim Soroush, a
distinguished Iranian religious intellectual whose
approach to Islam had allowed Iranian women
like Shahla Sherkat (editor of Zanan magazine)
to admit and articulate their feminism. I had
started reading his work in 1995, and learned
much from him. I later interviewed him when he
came to London and listened to recordings of his
lectures, which gave me a new language to talk
about Islam. I could identify with his
interpretation of religious texts but not his
gender perspective (to which I devoted a chapter
in Islam and Gender). In Berlin, I had extended
discussions with him and also with another
fellow, the feminist philosopher Nancy Fraser. At
NYU I also began an engagement with Carol
Gilligan, participating in her seminars on
‘Resisting Injustice’.
These experiences and encounters with scholars
of very different viewpoints have shaped my own
approach and given me a language with which to
engage with patriarchal interpretations of
Islam’s textual sources from within. In Marriage
on Trial (Mir-Hosseini 1993), I had made no
distinction between Sharia and fiqh; indeed in
popular discourse and among the Muslim women
with whom I worked, there was no such
distinction. But in 1995, in the course of my
fieldwork in Qom and through my debates with
Iranian clerics, I soon realised that the
distinction was crucial. It allowed me to pose
questions from within the tradition on
constructions of gender in Islamic legal thought.
My later engagements with prominent American
feminist theorists like Nancy Fraser and Carol
Gilligan made me realise that I could identify
with their feminism if not with their language
and approach to religion, but that their
knowledge of the politics of feminism in the
Muslim world, and of Islam as a religion, was so
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limited that, for example, in her last book,
Gilligan portrays Ayaan Hirsi Ali as the model of
resistance to patriarchy in Islamic contexts
(Gilligan and Richards 2009: 254). Their theories
helped me to understand better the feminism
that I was studying and now contributing to, even
if I could not apply their solutions. Unlike them,
I could not define my feminism and operate
without the need to be mindful of religion; the
resurgence of Islam in the 1970s as both a
spiritual and a political force did not allow me to
do so. But I felt a renewed confidence that it was
possible to look beyond the traditional stand-off
between religious and non-religious approaches,
to take justice and equality to be absolutely good,
no matter what path we choose to seek them.
5 New spaces, new voices
Before considering the implications of my
personal journey through ‘Islamic feminism’ for
the framing of gender policies and practices, let
me try to make explicit what has remained
implicit in my narrative.
First, the linkage between the religious and
political dimensions of identity in Muslim
contexts is, in my view, one of the key issues that
Muslim women confront in their struggle for
equality. This linkage is not new – it has its roots
in the colonial era – but it took on a new and
distinct expression in the 1970s with the
resurgence of Islam as a political and spiritual
force. With the end of the colonial era, the rise of
secular and despotic regimes in Muslim
countries and their suppression of progressive
forces left a vacuum that was filled by Islamist
movements. And these movements, dramatically
strengthened by the success of the Iranian
Revolution of 1979, gained momentum with the
subsequent perceived defeat of communism. But
it was not until the rise of the neo-conservatives
in the USA, and their response to the events of
9/11, in particular the invasions of Afghanistan
in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003 that Muslim women
found themselves in the crossfire. Both invasions
were partially justified in the name of ‘saving
Muslim women’; US neo-conservatives and
rightist parties in Europe noisily promoted
women of Muslim backgrounds such as Ayaan
Hirsi Ali and Irshad Manji, who openly voiced
criticism of what they understood as Islam,
though their understanding of Islam was in
effect as dogmatic and patriarchal as that of the
Islamists whom they opposed.
It is telling that in this workshop we had a session
devoted to ‘Contextualising the
instrumentalisation of religion on the ground’.
Should there not have been one on ‘The
instrumentalisation of human rights laws,
democracy and feminism on the ground’? I am
particularly sensitive to this, coming from a
country where foreign powers have twice in my
lifetime frustrated the development of democracy.
In 1953, the CIA and MI6 funded and
orchestrated a coup to topple Mohammad
Mosaddeq’s democratic government after he had
nationalised Iranian oil. My childhood and young
adult life were formed by the sense of frustration
of my father and his generation, who felt betrayed
by this coup (not to mention earlier twentieth
century foreign interventions since the
Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11). Without it,
there would have been no Islamic Revolution 25
years later. Then, in January 2002, after Iran
under President Khatami had firmly aligned itself
with the USA after the 9/11 attacks, George W.
Bush placed Iran in the ‘Axis of Evil’ and restarted
the rhetoric of regime change; once again the
democratic momentum was frustrated. With the
emergence of the Green Movement in the
aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections,
hopes for democratic change are again threatened
by growing US–Israeli talk of bombing or invasion,
on the pretext of Iran’s supposed work on nuclear
weapons. US-led Western antagonism to Iran has
effectively boosted the hardliners in government
and enabled them to silence the internal voices of
reform and dissent.
Second, I want to question why some feminists
are apparently unsettled by the engagement of
Muslim feminists like me with a search for
gender justice within Islam, while claiming and
acknowledging our faith position; Margot
Badran, for example, has recently stated that, in
claiming our faith, we are excluding others:
A Muslims-only endeavour, Musawah (Arabic
for equality), which is directing its effort to
reforming ‘the Muslim family’, narrows down
the circumference of activism. Why, many are
asking, should Muslims only direct and decide
on issues in campaigns mobilising Islamic
feminist discourse aimed at reforming fiqh-
backed family laws? (Badran 2010)
As a scholar of ‘Islamic feminism’, Badran should
know that, although Musawah made a conscious
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decision to be Muslim-led, it does not exclude
other activists and voices. The Musawah
Framework for Action was shaped by a planning
committee that included several secularist
women (e.g. Amal Abdel Hadi, Rabea Naciri,
Pinar Ilkkaracan), and was greatly influenced by
the successful campaigns for the reform of family
law by Moroccan women, some of them staunch
secularists.
Others see such efforts as doomed. Hania
Sholkamy, for example, argues that they will face
‘equally authentic’ interpretations of the sacred
sources, and, unable to ‘oppose the divine will’,
will be defeated by the impossibility of judging
whose interpretations are correct (Sholkamy
2010). Is this not defeatist? Women in Musawah
seek just such engagements with proponents of
supposedly authentic but patriarchal versions of
the Islamic legal tradition. They believe that
their own arguments are better grounded in both
that tradition and the sources of International
Human Rights law; above all they insist that any
Islamic authority that denies justice as it is
understood today cannot be authentic and should
be challenged. This is why both scholar/activists
like me, and Musawah as a movement, claim the
tradition and place ourselves firmly within it.
Faced by an apparent choice between the devil of
those who want to impose patriarchal
interpretations of Islam’s sacred texts, and the
deep blue sea of those who pursue a neo-
colonialist hegemonic global project in the name
of enlightenment and feminism, those of us
committed to achieving justice for women and a
just world have no other option than to bring
Islamic and feminist perspectives together.
Otherwise, Muslim women’s quest for equality
will remain hostage to different political forces
and tendencies, as it was in the twentieth century
and continues to be in the new century that
began with the politics of the ‘war on terror’.
If my analysis and my hunches are correct, the
year 2009 may prove to have been as important as
1979 in shifting the politics of religion and
feminism onto new ground, both globally and
locally. The launch of Musawah is not alone in
marking a new phase in Muslim women’s struggle
against Islamist attempts to justify and revive
gender inequality, patriarchy and autocratic rule.
Another such marker is the emergence in 2009 of
the Green Movement in Iran, where the debate
has moved on and the political divisions are now
clear-cut. Those who reject the feminist project in
Islam are those who are aligned with the despotic
and authoritarian elements in the Islamic
Republic. After the election of President
Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and the emergence
of the first wave of the reform movement, they
were aligned with the Islamic rightists, who were
then known as ‘Conservatives’ but in 2005, when
hardliner President Ahmadinejad was elected,
called themselves Principlists (usulgara’ian), a
euphemism for ‘fundamentalists’. For increasing
numbers, feminism is no longer a bad word and
many leaders in the Green Movement, including
Zahra Rahnavard (wife of Mir-Hossein Mousavi),
openly claim it. The movement is still in its
infancy, and it is not fully formed, but it has
moved beyond ‘where is my vote?’ to become an
organic, colourful, fluid and grassroots movement
for civil rights. These developments have been
catalysed by reactions to both the Islamist slogan
of ‘return to Sharia’ and the ‘war on terror’. Both
political Islam and international and secular
feminism, having manifestly failed in practice to
secure justice for women, have lost credibility and
legitimacy. The new phase coincides with a shift in
relations between religion and feminism that
some have spoken of as ‘post-Islamism’ and ‘post-
secularism’.
There always have been, and will be, competing
interpretations of Islam’s sacred texts. The
power of any interpretation depends, not on its
correctness, but on the social and political forces
supporting its claims to authenticity. Fully aware
of this, feminist voices and scholarship in Islam
are challenging, on their own terms and from
within the same tradition, those who use religion
to justify patriarchy. The women in Musawah
and many of the reformists in the Iranian Green
Movement insist that the Sharia is an ideal
embodying the justice of Islam, that justice today
must include equality, and that consequently
patriarchal interpretations of the Sharia are
completely unacceptable.
6 Conclusion
Let me conclude by clarifying an assertion I have
made in public, which appears to have caused
resentment and misunderstanding. At the 2009
meeting in Kuala Lumpur to launch Musawah, I
repeated what I had written earlier in a
published article: ‘In my view, secular feminism
in the Muslim world fulfilled its historical role by
paving the way for women’s entry into politics
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and society in the early twentieth century’ (Mir-
Hosseini 2006: 644). I was quoted in a New York
Times report of the launch as elaborating that
‘Secular feminism has fulfilled its historical role
but it has nothing more to give us’ (Tavernise
2009). The context that was missing, however,
was a rather heated exchange with some ‘secular
feminists’, who had questioned the possibility of
an ‘Islamic feminism’. Others have also rejected
my apparent dismissal of ‘secular feminism’. I
will simply repeat here that rejection was not my
intent, but rather, then as now, I call for a
reconciliation and transcendence of the
distinction. We are all heading in the same
direction, but we also need to recognise and
value the diversity in our approaches and create
spaces where different feminisms and voices can
work together towards the same goal.
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Notes
1 See for instance, Yoginder Sikand’s recent
online interviews with Margot Badran, at
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/
sikand090210.html, and myself at
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/
sikand210910.html.
2 For the launch of Musawah, see
www.musawah.org, in particular the
pressroom and Mir-Hosseini (2009c).
3 For an analysis of the centrality of gender and
the place of women in this movement, see
Mir-Hosseini (2009b).
4 This is the case for many distinguished
activists, for instance, Zainah Anwar in
Malaysia and Shahla Sherkat and Fatemeh
Rake’i in Iran. Anwar has stated, ‘I prefer to
call myself a Muslim feminist, because the
term Muslim signifies human agency and how
I, as a human being, understand God and
religion’ (Anwar 2009).
5 I hesitate to use the term ‘secularism’, for
which there are many different definitions.
6 See, for instance, Mir-Hosseini (2006, 2009,
2010a).
7 There is now an extensive literature on this
‘Islamic feminism’. For overviews, see Badran
(2009) and Mir-Hosseini (2006).
8 Written under her married name, Mahboubeh
Ommi; for a discussion, see Mir-Hosseini
(1996: 160–1), and for her later stance, see
Mir-Hosseini (2002: 112–13).
9 I have been at workshop meetings with both
and I have great respect for the work they are
doing; in March 2010, I had a candid dialogue
with Nadia Yassin, which will appear in a
forthcoming book.
10 It is here that my approach and my account of
the evolution of ‘Islamic feminism’ differ from
those of Margot Badran.
11 On this point too, my analysis diverges from
that of Badran.
12 I strongly protested that her account distorted
my scholarship and misrepresented my
position; these were partially addressed in the
revised version (2002).
13 It is being addressed in the emerging
literature of feminist scholarship in Islam; for
a partial list, see Mir-Hosseini (2006), and for
my own approach, see Mir-Hosseini (2007,
2009a, 2009d, 2010a).
14 See, for instance, reviews by Afary (1996) and
Haeri (1995), and my exchange with the
latter (Mir-Hosseini 1998).
15 I also claim the identity of ‘native’ anthropologist,
which adds to my Iranian/Muslim identity a
consciousness of the link between epistemology
and politics; this consciousness, in my view,
helps to bridge the gap between ‘insider’ or
‘outsider’ perspectives, see Mir-Hosseini (2010b).
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